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DO THE FEDERAL COURTS SWEEP BUIE(LEAN?
by Jeffrey T Wennar

The development of exceptions to the
Foir1h \mendment's warrant requirement
repre it ai balance between safety and privacy. Often they are designed to grant arresting police officers an opportunity to secure a
person, area, or items that represent a threat
to the individual officer or public. Alternately,
these exceptions can be viewed as an encroachment on individual rights that enable police to
skirt the Fourth Amendment. Over the years,
the United States Supreme Court and federal
circuits have emphasized that searches and seizures outside the narrow exceptions are presumptively invalid. While many articles and
analyses of these exceptions review the incentives, impacts, and influences these exceptions
have on criminal procedure, the words used by
federal courts have become increasingly indicative of a permissive approach to criminal procedure. This article reviews those developments
with particular attention to verbiage used by
courts in applying the decision Marylandv.Buie
and the underlying rationale for the "protective
sweep" exception to the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched,

and the persons or things to be
seized.'
A point of departure for any understanding
of the Fourth Amendment was established in
Coolidge . New Hampshire when the Supreme

Court held that "[t]he most basic constitutional role in this area is that 'searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically established and
well defined exceptions."2
Over the years the Supreme Court has
recognized certain exceptions to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment including: searches incident to arrest; automobile
searches;4 the plain view exception;5 the inven1
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971)
(citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
3
See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969)
abrogation recognized by Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419
(2011) (implying that in the absence of a warrant, a warrantless
Fourth Amendment search may be valid if confined to the
immediate person and area in which an arrested suspect may
have obtained a weapon or something that could be used as
evidence against him).
4
See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970)
(holding with regard to the search of accused's car, "[t]he
blue station wagon could have been searched on the spot
when it was stopped since there was probable cause to search
and it was a fleeting target for a search ... In that event
there is little to choose in terms of practical consequences
between an immediate search without a warrant and the car's
immobilization until a warrant is obtained").
5
See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467-68 (noting that the
plain-view doctrine does not run afoul of Fourth Amendment
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tory exception;6 the consent exception;, Terry tion.14 The following text surveys the current
stops;" the abandoned property exception;' status of protective sweeps throughout the fedthe hot pursuit exceptionlo or the exigent cir- eral circuits.
cumstances exception;" the community-careI. The Buie Decision
taking exception;1 the suitcase or container
exception;" and the protective sweep excepIn Maryland v'.Buie, a Godfather's pizza
restaurant in Prince George's County, Maryrequirements in that such a search is made only incident to a
land was robbed by two men? One of the roblawful search or some other lawful law enforcement activity,
and that the scope of such a search is inherently narrow and
bers wore a red running suit. The police dedoes not expand into a general or exploratory search).
veloped Jerome Edward Buie as a suspect and
6
See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375-76
subsequently obtained a warrant for his arrest
(1976) (holding a search of an impounded car did not violate
and that of his accomplice. The warrant for
the Fourth Amendment when such search occurred incident
Buie was executed at his residence, and Buie
only to the taking of inventory of the contents of the vehicle).
7
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49
was arrested as he emerged from the basement
(1973) (holding that when a suspect is not in custody, a search
will not violate the Fourth Amendment if it is voluntarily
consented to in the absence of duress or coercion).
8
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (holding
that there is no Fourth Amendment violation where, "a
police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing
in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for
the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault
him").
9
See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960)
(noting that there was no Fourth Amendment violation when
hotel management consented to an FBI search of the room
after a suspect abandoned property in a hotel room trash can
and checked out of the hotel).
10
See Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) (commenting "[t]here
are exceptions to this [warrant] rule. Searches may be made
incident to a lawful arrest, and-as today's decision indicatesin the course of 'hot pursuit"').
11
See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978)
(citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948))
(noting that "warrants are generally required to search a
person's home or his person unless 'the exigencies of the
situation' make the needs of law enforcement so compelling
that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment").
12
See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447-48 (1973)
(holding that searches conducted in the course of an officer's
caretaking duties are not facially unreasonable in the absence
of a warrant).
13
See generally United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1, 14-15 (1977) abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
565 (1991) (recognizing that warrantless searches of luggage
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of the home. After the arrest an officer entered

the basement "in case there was someone else
[there]," and in doing so, the officer observed
the red running suit in plain view and he seized
it.16
Buie made a motion to suppress the red

running suit prior to trial, which the trial court
denied., On appeal to the intermediate appellate court, the trial judge's ruling was affirmed.
The Maryland Court of Appeals subsequently
reversed the Court of Special Appeals holding that the running suit was inadmissible as
the state failed to satisfy the probable cause
requirement. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari and framed the issue
as one of determining "what level of justification the Fourth Amendment required before
[the detective] could legally enter the basement
to see if someone else was there."" The Court
acknowledged that until the moment Buie was
arrested "the police had the right, based on the
authority of the arrest warrant, to search anywhere in the house that Buie might have been
found, including the basement."19
may be conducted, so long as the search occurs incident to an
arrest, or there is an exigent circumstance).
14
See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1990)
(holding that to require a warrant for a protective sweep would
be an unnecessarily strict Fourth Amendment standard).
15
Id. at 328.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 330.
19
Id.
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Justice White, writing for the majority,
analogized Terry . Ohio and Michigan . Long
to the case at hand. With regard to Terry, Justice White noted:

[We held that an on-the-street
"frisk" for weapons must be tested
by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches because such a frisk
involves "an entire rubric of police
conduct- necessarily
swift action
predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the heatwhich historically has not been, and
as a practical matter could not be,
subjected to the warrant procedure.
Similarly as it related to Long, Justice White reflected:

[T]he search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited
to those areas in which a weapon
may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a
reasonable belief based on "specific
and articulable facts which, taken
together with the rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant" the officer in believing that the
suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of
weapons.2 2

A

knowledged the risk of officers' safety in the

home and found "[it] is as great as, if not greater
than, it is in an on-the-street or roadside investigatory encounter."24 The Court's rationale for
this safety risk was due in large part to being

an officer's disadvantage of on his "adversary's
turf.'2

The Court limited the search "as an

incident to the arrest the officers could, as a
precautionary matter and without probable
cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets
and other spaces immediately adjoining the
place of arrest from which an attack could be
launched."6 The Court then went on to place
further restrictions on what officers could do
beyond a precautionary sweep noting, "just as
in Terry and Long, there must be articulable
facts which, taken together with the rational
inferences from those facts, would warrant a
reasonably prudent officer in believing that the
area to be swept harbors an individual posing
a danger."2 The Court cautioned, however, that
such a sweep is not the equivalent of a search;
it must be swift and last only long enough to
dispel any reasonable suspicion of danger.

Further, a protective Buie sweep is a

more limited intrusion than that articulated in
Chimel. California.28 Unlike a Chimel search, allowing the immediate area of the arrestee to be
searched, which is essentially automatic, a Buie
Justice White noted that "[t]he ingredi- sweep may only be conducted "when justified
ents to apply the balance struck in Terry and by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
Long are present .... Possessing an arrest war- house is harboring a person posing a danger to
rant and probable cause to believe Buie was those on the arrest scene."29 Thus, the underlyin his home, the officers were entitled to enter ing rational for the protective sweep doctrine is
and to search anywhere in the house in which the principle that police officers should be able
Buie might be found."21 The Court further ac- to ensure their safety when they lawfully enter a
private dwelling.o The officer must have a rea20
See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983)
(holding that "the balancing required by Terry clearly weighs

in favor of allowing the police to conduct an area search of the
passenger compartment to uncover weapons, as long as they
possess an articulable and objectively reasonable belief that the
suspect is potentially dangerous").
21
Buie, 494 U.S. at 331-32 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
22
Buie, 494 U.S. at 332 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. at 1049-50).
23
Id. at 332-33.

24
Id. at 333.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 334.
27
Id.
28
See generallyBuie, 494 U.S. at 336 (distinguishing the
facts of Chimel from those of Buie).
29
Id.
30
Leaf v. Shelnutt, 400 E3d 1070, 1087 (7th Cir. 2005)
(quoting United States v. Burrows, 48 E3d 1011, 1015-16 (7th
Cir. 1995)).
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sonable suspicion of danger.,1 For an officer to
harbor a reasonable suspicion of danger there
must be "articulable facts, which taken together
with the rational inferences from those facts,
would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in
believing that the area to be swept harbors an
individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.",2

II. Articulable Suspicion
The circuit courts differ on what circumstances are constitutionally sufficient to
justify a Buie sweep. In UnitedStates (. Winston,
the First Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with an interlocutory appeal from the government regarding the District Court of Massachusetts' suppression of evidence holding
that the Buie doctrine had been violated. The
circuit court addressed the facts known to the

agents:
First, the agents had information to
believe that Winston was armed and
dangerous and possibly with armed
cohorts.
Winston was indicted,
along with twenty-five others, for
distribution of cocaine as part of an
investigation of a large-scale cocaine
trafficking organization. One of the
other defendants informed agents
that he had sold Winston two handguns and a bullet-proof vest. One
of the agents present had also previ-

ously arrested Winston after a traffic stop for possession of a handgun.
Second ... that Winston's girlfriend

initially denied having knowledge of
Winston's car."34
In reversing and remanding the case, the
majority of the court held that the agents had
the right to protect themselves from Winston
and other circumstances "reasonably within
the scope of the dangers they were facing, i.e.,
31
See generallyBuie, 494 U.S. at 335-36 (inferring
the need for a reasonable suspicion of danger to exist before
conducting a sweep).
32
Id. at 334.
33
444 E3d 115,116 (1st Cir. 2006).
34
Id. at 118.
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an arrest involving a member of a drug organization with multiple constituents, not all of
whom had been accounted for, who were likely
to be armed, as Winston was, in a setting which
presented an opportunity for ambush or similar
violent conduct against the arresting officers."
On the other hand, in United States .
Moran Vargas, the Second Circuit concluded
there was no objective basis, nor evidence of
subjective fear, when it found that an agent's
testimony alone was not sufficient to amount to
articulable facts that would lead a "reasonably
prudent officer" to believe that a dangerous individual was hiding in the bathroom.6 In addressing reasonable belief, in Perkins . United
States, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "[i]n the fifteen years since Buie, this circuit
has had several opportunities to apply the decision. And in each instance that the officers had
a reasonable belief that another person (besides
the seized individual) was on the premises and
posed a threat to the officers who were making the arrest the court has upheld a protective sweep incident to the arrest."" An earlier
decision by that circuit suppressed evidence
located during a protective sweep, stating there
was no specific basis to believe anyone else was
in the house." Along these same lines, United
States . Johnson, the Seventh Circuit reminded
lower courts and law enforcement officers that
"although the Supreme Court has found exceptions to the warrant requirement in a number
of compelling situations, it has never deviated
from the rule that generalized suspicion alone
is not enough to justify a warrantless search
of a home, or a seizure of a person incident to
such a search.""1

35
Id. at 120.
36
376 E3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 2004).
37
127 E App'x 830, 834 (6th Cir. 2005).
38
See United States v. Akwari, 920 F.2d 418, 420 (6th
Cir. 1990) (holding a protective sweep of a residence was
improper because officers faced no resistance when entering,
received no threats after arrests were made, and heard no
voices or noises after arrests indicating any potential danger).
39
170 E3d 708, 710 (7th Cir. 1999).

4
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III. Arrests
Buie identifies two types of warrantless
protective sweeps of a residence that are constitutionally permissible immediately following an arrest.40 The first type allows officers to
"look in closets and other spaces immediately
adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched."41 The
second type of sweep goes 'beyond' immediately adjoining areas, but is confined to 'such
a protective sweep aimed at protecting the arresting officers.' While the first type of sweep
requires no probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the second requires "'articulable facts
which, taken together with the rational inferences from the facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area
to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene."'42 The Tenth
Circuit noted, "Buie applies to both protective
searches and protective detentions because
the Court's reasoning in Buie supports treating protective sweeps and protective detention
similarly." 4

A

into an unlocked cabinet on the top shelf of
the closet, resulted in the court eschewing the
application of Buie: "The cabinet searched was
too small to accommodate a person."'4 Having
declined to authorize the search pursuant to
the "protective sweep" exception, the First Circuit proceeded to analyze the search under the
search incident to arrest doctrine.46
In the Second Circuit, however, in UnitedStates . Blue,4 when officers looked between
the mattress and box spring, the court found
that because it was within the immediate reach
of the defendant, such a search was permissible.4s An earlier case in the Second Circuit focused on two questions when addressing this
issue: "one, whether the search was 'properly
limited;' and two, whether it was reasonable
for the deputy marshal to conclude that [the
suspect] posed a danger to those on the arrest
scene." 4 The court reasoned that the deputy
marshal could search the immediate area to
"'neutralize the threat of physical harm' by determining whether there were weapons within
[the suspect's] reach.""

A. Closets and Spaces

In two unpublished opinions, the
Fourth Circuit approved the search of a bedCourts have struggled with allowing of- room closet after an in-house arrest, but cauficers to justify "protective sweeps" in certain tioned, "that is not to say, however that Buie
spaces. A common issue among many circuits is condones a top-to-bottom search of a private
the search between the mattress and box spring residence simply because law enforcement ofof a bed. "It may well be that during the course ficers have carried out a valid custodial arrest
of an otherwise justified protective sweep for a on the premises."51 In a more recent decision,
dangerous individual, thought to be hiding, the the Fourth Circuit accepted the testimony of a
Fourth Amendment permits a simultaneously deputy United States marshal, and found it an
conducted limited search of places which might objectively reasonable action for the deputy to
contain a weapon readily accessible to that as45
United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 50 (1st Cir.
yet-undiscovered individual."44 Police officers 2007).
escorted the defendant through his house to 46
See id. (referring to Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
his bedroom so he could get dressed. A quick (1969)).
United States v. Blue, 78 E3d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 1996).
sweep of the bed and closet, along with a look 47
40
United States v. Archibald, 589 E3d 289, 295 (6th
Cir. 2009).
41
Archibald, 589 F.3d at 295 (citing Maryland v. Buie,
494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990)).
42
Id.
43
United States v. Maddox, 388 F.3d 1356, 1362 (10th
Cir. 2004).
44
Crooker v. Metallo, 5 E3d 583, 585 (1st Cir. 1993).

48
Id. at 60 (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763) (defining
the within the immediate reach to mean "the area from within
which [the defendant] might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence").
49
United States v. Hernandez, 941 F.2d 133, 136 (2d Cir.
1991).
50
Id. at 137.
51
United States v. Pettiford, No. 94-5391, 1995 WL
151863, at *3 (4th Cir. Apr. 7, 1995).
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search a bedroom where he had previously discovered an individual hiding under a mattress.5
Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit has
found that an agent was justified in looking in
a bedroom immediately adjoining the place of
arrest.'
The agent's subjective intentions are
not relevant as long as the protective sweep was
objectively reasonable.5
In 2005, the Second Circuit was presented with the question whether a Buie protective
sweep may be conducted when officers are lawfully present in a home for a reason other than
the in-home execution of an arrest warrant.
The court, in applying Buie held:

[A] law enforcement officer present
in a home under lawful process, such
as an order permitting or directing
the officer to enter for the purpose
of protecting a third party, may conduct a protective sweep when the
officer possesses 'articulable facts
which, taken together with the rational inferences from the facts, would
warrant a reasonably pnident officer
in believing that the area to be swept
harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the ... scene.

6

In a commonsense approach the court
stated, "The restriction of the protective sweep
doctrine only to circumstances involving arrests would jeopardize the safety of officers
in contravention of the pragmatic concept
of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth
Amendment."',
52
United States v. Williamson, 250 F. App'x 532, 533
(4th Cir. 2007).
53
See United States v. Ford, 56 F.3d 265, 266 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (stating that a sweep of the bedroom immediately
adjoining the hallway where the defendant was arrested was
permitted, but only items in plain view could be seized).
54
See United States v. Lawlor, 406 F.3d 37, 43 n.8 (1st
Cir. 2005) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813
(1996) (holding that an officer's subjective belief is irrelevant to
Fourth Amendment analysis)).
55
See United States v. Miller, 430 F.3d 93, 94-95
(2d Cir. 1995) (considering whether an officer, lawfully at
defendant's apartment to execute a protective order issued to
his roommate, could sweep defendant's bedroom).
56
Id. at 98.
57
Miller, 430 F.3d at 100.
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Having said this, the question of consent leading to subsequent sweeps also found
its way to the Second Circuit. In UnitedStates
v. Gandia, the defendant gave consent to officers to enter a kitchen. As the officers entered
the area, they looked into the living room and
observed a bullet. In response, they conducted
a protective sweep prior to placing the defendant under arrest.8 The Southern District of
New York held, "limited pre-arrest protective
sweeps of a home for officer safety are lawful
where there are specific articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion of risk to the
The circuit court then reofficers' safety."
manded the case to the district court to decide
the issue of consent,60 warning the trial court
that "generously construing Buie will enable
and encourage officers to obtain that consent
as a pretext for conducting a warrantless search
of the home."6 The Sixth Circuit approved a
search of an upstairs area where the defendant
was observed coming from the upstairs and followed by his son from upstairs shortly thereafter.62
Analogizing Terry, the Eighth Circuit
found that "since an officer approaching a suspected drug trafficker in the open is justified in
conducting a Terry stop and frisk out of concern that the suspect may resort to violence to
thwart the encounter, it follows that an officer
arresting a suspected drug trafficker in one
room of a multi-room residence is justified in
conducting a Buie sweep out of concern that
there could be individuals lurking in the other
rooms who may resort to violence to thwart the

58

United States v. Gandia, 424 F.3d 255, 259 (2d Cir.

2005).
59
Id. at 260 (citing United States v. Gandia, No. S1 03
Cr. 1503, 2004 WL 1396164 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2004)).
60
Gandia, 424 F.3d at 265.
61
Id. at 262.
62
United States v. Stover, 474 F.3d 904, 910-11 (6th
Cir. 2007). But see United States v. Waldner, 425 F.3d 514, 517
(8th Cir. 2005) (finding no need for officers to search where
officers had accompanied a husband to his home to retrieve his
belongings and positioned themselves between the man and
his in-house office).

6
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arrest."63 The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, motel room. 69
only finds protective sweeps valid when perIn UnitedStates 9.Davis, o an Eighth Cirformed incident to an arrest.64
cuit case, a team of officers entered the front
B. Arrest Outside the Home
door as the defendant was exiting the rear door.
As the defendant was exiting, he was placed unAlthough Buie addresses an in-home der arrest. 1 Officers did a protective sweep of
arrest and protective sweep, various federal the home and the barn, a building that did not
circuits have been presented with situations adjoin the house. Because the officers had obwhere the arrest took place outside of the home served Davis make two trips between the house
followed by a protective sweep inside the home. and the barn located approximately 100 yards
The First Circuit took a pragmatic approach to apart, the court upheld the protective sweep of
this predicament: "an arrest that occurs just the barn.12 Though "the barn did not immedioutside the home can pose an equally serious ately adjoin the area of arrest, the barn was not
threat to arresting officers as one that occurs so far removed from the house that a reasonin the home."65 In similar fashion, the Second able prudent officer could dismiss the potential
Circuit approved a sweep of an apartment fol- danger."
lowing the arrest of the suspect just outside.66
In Sharrar .Felsing, a Third Circuit case, all inIn a 2006 Ninth Circuit case, the facts
dividuals were arrested outside the home, and presented a situation with the police observing
the police had no information that was anyone the defendant exiting the establishment with
else in the home; the court declined to limit a brown bag. He then reentered the buildBuie sweeps to in home arrests, but found that ing. Two people then exited the building, and
the standard was not met in this case. 61 The shortly thereafter the defendant exited without
Fifth Circuit upheld a protective sweep of the the bag. The police had observed the defenhome after an arrest on a porch outside the dant when he reentered the building and saw
home occurred.68 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit him pause, take the bag off his shoulder and
approved a protective sweep of a motel room put it down. Police conducted a protective
after an arrest in a parking lot outside of the sweep.71 Citing an earlier decision from that
circuit (that predates Buie) which upheld a protective sweep of the interior of a house when
63
United States v. Cash, 378 F.3d 745, 749 (8th Cir.
an arrest had been made outside of the house,
2004).
the court reasoned that "'[a] bullet fired at an
64
See United States v. Garza, 125 E App'x 927, 931
(10th Cir. 2005) (holding officers' sweep of a hotel bathroom
improper because it was not executed incident to an arrest and
because officers had no reasonable belief that the bathroom
contained individuals posing danger to anyone).
65
United States v. Lawlor, 406 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir.
2005).
66
See United States v. Oguns, 921 E2d 442, 446-47
(2d Cir. 1990) (holding officers' sweep of an apartment valid
following an arrest outside the apartment because officers had
a reasonable belief that individuals posing an immediate threat
were inside).
67
Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 825 (3d Cir. 1997)
(concluding the standard was not met and reasoned, "[w]e
see no reason to impose a bright line rule limiting protective
sweeps to in-home arrests. . . " but acknowledged that they
"must consider whether there was an articulable basis for a
protective sweep . . . ").
68
United States v. Watson, 273 F.3d 599, 603 (5th Cir.
2001).

arresting officer standing outside a window

is as deadly as one that is projected from one
room to another."' "6 In dicta, the court, concurring with other circuits, stated, "[T]he location
69
United States v. Biggs, 70 E3d 913, 914 (6th Cir.
1995); see also United States v. Colbert, 76 E3d, 773, 778 (6th
Cir. 1996).
70
See United States v. Davis, 471 F.3d 938 (8th Cir.
2006).
71
Id. at 942.
72
Id. at 941-42.
73
Id. at 945.
74
United States v. Paopao, 465 E3d 404, 407 (9th Cir.
2006), amended, 469 F.3d 760 (9th Cir 2006).
75
See generally United States v. Hoyos, 892 E2d 1387
(9th Cir. 1989).
76
Paopao,465 F.3d at 409 (quoting Hoyos, 892 F.2d at
1397).
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of the arrest, inside or outside the premises,
should only bear on the question of whether
the officers had a justifiable concern for their
safety."

Four years

later, in

United States

The Buie exception is particularly
toxic to Fourth Amendment values

because it permits a search with zero

individualized suspicion-with nothing at all but the presumption that
the home is a dangerous place for
the police. This is a fair presumption if the police are already inside
the home and exposed to danger.
But to use the exception as a wedge
for entering the home turns Buie inside out.1
The dissent notes Lemus should be distinguished from United States 9.Paopao, another
case in which the court dealt with an arrest
made outside the home, by noting that in
Paopao the court upheld a sweep of the home
"only because the officers had 'a reasonable
suspicion of danger.'"2

A Tenth Circuit opinion, in UnitedStates
Paopao,465 E3d at 410.
United States v. Lemus, 596 E3d 512 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 514 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 515.
Id.
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differs from the aforementioned cas-

. . reasonable threats posed to ... officers when
.

Lemus, " the Ninth Circuit denied a request for
an en banc hearing. In Lemus, an arrest had
occurred just outside the home. The defendant
attempted to return inside and was arrested before fully entering the home, and a sweep was
done of the home, which the court upheld.-'9 In
a strongly worded dissent, Chief Judge Kozinski wrote, "The panel says the police could
enter the house-with no suspicion whatsoeverbecause Lemus's living room 'immediately adjoined' the place surrounding the arrest, but
Buie only authorizes a suspicion-less search
when the police make an 'in-house-arrest' (and
then only for a small area near the arrest, not
a grand tour of the entire apartment)."o Chief
Judge Kozinski continued:

77
78
79
80
81
82

. Maddox,

es as it does not expressly limit the protective
sweep areas within the home, and further the
court concluded "that it is proper to consider.
drawing the boundaries of the arrest scene in
an individual case."," Additionally, in the Eleventh Circuit, the court found appropriate the
sweep of a house conducted once the suspect
had been ordered outside and was placed under arrest. 4
In a doorway threshold situation, the
District of Columbia Circuit also declined
to narrowly define the place of arrest stating,
"merely in order to avoid permitting the police
to sweep the entirety of a small apartment. The
safety of the officers, not the percentage of the
home searched, is the relevant criterion."115 The

same circuit opined, "Although Buie concerned
an arrest made in the home, the principles
enunciated by the Supreme Court are fully applicable where, as here, the arrest takes place
just outside the residence."6 The court went
on to explain that the officers' exact location,
whether in or outside of a home at the time of
arrest, does not change the nature of the appropriate inquiry, which is: "Did articulable facts
exist that would lead a reasonably prudent officer to believe a sweep was required to protect
the safety of those on the arrest scene?",
WI

Exigency

"It is well established that 'exigent circumstances,' including the need to prevent the
destruction of evidence, permit police officers
to conduct an otherwise permissible search
83

388 E3d 1356, 1363 (10th Cir. 2004) (involving

a situation where federal marshals and local deputies were
executing an arrest warrant, Maddox, as well as approximately
four others, arrived at the house while law enforcement officers
were inside the residence; Maddox's actions warranted his pat
down by the officers).
84
See generally United States v. Kimmons, 965 E2d
1001 (11th Cir. 1992).
85
United States v. Thomas, 429 E3d 282, 287 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
86
United States v. Henry, 48 E3d 1282, 1284 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
87
Id.
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without first obtaining a warrant.""" However,
although exigent circumstances may justify a
warrantless probable cause entry into the home,
they will not do so if 'the exigent circumstances
were manufactured by the agents."'11 United
States . Hassock is the most recent Federal ap-

pellate decision to examine Buie. 90 An interagency task force received information that an
individual had a semiautomatic handgun at a
specific address in the Bronx. Task force members went to the apartment to conduct a "knock
and talk" to interview the resident in order to
obtain information regarding the person they
were seeking. A woman answered the door
who stated, in response to an agent's question,
that she did not know if anyone else was in the
residence. Agents asked to look around and
the woman consented. In a bedroom, beneath
a bed, the agent recovered a .380 caliber pistol.

incident to Hassock's interrogation
or arrest. Instead, the 'sweep' itself
became the purpose for the agents'
continued presence on the premises
insofar as they thereby searched the
location for Hassock.9 4

The Fifth Circuit "has created a nonexhaustive five-factor list to determine whether
exigent circumstances exist: one, the degree of
urgency involved and the amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant; two, the reasonable
belief that contraband is about to be removed;
three, the possibility of danger to the police
officers guarding the site of contraband while
a search warrant is sought; four, the information indicating that the possessors of the contraband are aware that the police are on their
trail; and five, the ready destructibility of the
contraband and knowledge that efforts to dispose of it and to escape are characteristics in
which those trafficking in contraband generally
engage.",9'

At the suppression hearing, the government argued the task force members were conducting a lawful protective sweep pursuant to
Buie.91 In granting the defendant's Motion to
V Conclusion
Suppress, the district court observed, "by mak"The legality of the protective sweep is
ing a voluntary decision to enter the [a]partment ... the task force put themselves at risk of a difficult question. It requires balancing two
the very danger that necessitated the protective deeply important interests the lives of law ensweep."92 The government based its appeal on forcement officers and the constitutional right
the holding in Buie. In reaching its holding, the of the people to be secure in their homes unSecond Circuit made a thorough examination der the Fourth Amendment."96 Courts remain
of its sister circuits. - The Court concluded:
concerned with the physical well being of of-

[T]he agents here had no legal process and, although they went to the
Hassock apartment with a legitimate
purpose the questioning and possible arrest of Hassock when Hassock
did not answer the door,that purpose
could not be pursued until Hassock
was found. Under these circumstances, the sweep cannot be viewed
as a reasonable security measure
88
89
2004).
90
91
92
Supp. 2d
93

Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1853-54 (2011).
United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 590 (5th Cir.
United States v. Hassock, 631 F.3d 79 (2011).
Id. at 80-83.
Id. at 83-84 (quoting United States v. Hassock, 676 E
154, 161-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)).
Hassock, 631 E3d at 89.

ficers placed in harm's way. "On the Government's side of the balance, we have the substantial and important interest in preserving
officer safety."" "[P]hysical entry of the home
is the chief evil against which the wording of
the Fourth Amendment is directed.""1 The Buie
decision, which created the "protective sweep"

exception to the Fourth Amendment, is alive,
94
Id. at 88.
95
United States v. Mata, 517 E3d 279, 287 (5th Cir.
2008) (citing United States v. Gomez-Moreno, 494 E3d 350,
354-55 (5th Cir 2007)).
96
United States v. Delancy, 502 E3d 1297, 1307 (11th
Cir. 2007).
97
United States v. Enslin, 327 F.3d 788, 796 (9th Cir.
2003).
98
United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 583 (5th Cir.
2004) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980)).
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well, and thriving. Federal Circuit Courts have
not dismantled Buie, but rather expanded the
practicality of its holding for law enforcement
officers with articulated reasonable suspicion.
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